CHAPTER 1

THE PARADOX OF TACTICS

After intense confrontations such as that at Columbia, it might have been expected that most moderate students would follow the lead of the extremists, adopting their tactics as they had supported their goals. Instead, moderate students often reasserted their commitment to non-violence and their determination to work within the system.

We call this the paradox of tactics, and it is dramatically apparent in the history of the student movement during the past few years. The more violent the extremists became, the more active many non-violent moderates became. As the number of violent and terroristic acts increased, so too did the frequency with which moderates would organize large --sometimes enormous -- non-violent protest demonstrations. Whenever a demonstration was planned well in advance and there were grounds to fear that it would be violent, moderates did all they could to assert themselves. They would help plan the demonstration, enlist student marshals to control the crowds, and make transportation and living arrangements for the thousands who would be present. As a rule, such demonstrations proceeded peacefully, thereby vindicating the good intentions and, self- discipline of the student protestors.

This gradual escalation of violence and this growing involvement of great numbers of moderates in attempts to provide more acceptable modes of political action recurred in a cycle which repeated itself at many campuses.

In 1964, the year of the Berkeley invention, almost all the tactics used by student protestors were non- violent. Even the most militant students agreed that the purpose of a demonstration was to mobilize support for reform by appealing to the better nature of the American people. Experience had shown this to be an effective strategy. The sight of young black and white activists enduring with dignity the attacks of southern police inspired many Americans. Public sentiment, especially in the north, was consequently favorable.

At Berkeley, and indeed for three years after Berkeley, campus protest generally proceeded in this spirit of non-violence. Demonstrations were generally just that --actions designed primarily to bear witness to the participants' views and depth of concern. At their most extreme, tactics were calculated to provoke officials into an intemperate response and thereby gain sympathy from the previously uncommitted. But protestors believed that if they were to. win such sympathy, their own conduct had to be non-violent, and generally it was. Few instances of violent behavior by students, even under provocation, are recorded for student protest from 1964 to 1967.

But after 1967, perhaps influenced by the terrible riots in Newark and Detroit in the summer of that year, some radical students began to employ more extremist tactics. The political views of radical students became ever more extreme, and their commitment to non-violence was displaced by an increasingly revolutionary impulse. They adopted new tactics designed to shock the American people into a radical perspective on American society. The increasing self-assurance, isolation, and solidarity of these extremists also contributed to this change of tactics. Those who believe their cause is unquestionably right and who act in solidarity with their friends feel that little is impermissible.

During the summer of 1969, the SDS split during its national convention in Chicago. A major issue was the question of tactics. One faction, led by the Progressive Labor Party, wanted to organize the working class to make a revolution; it insisted on strict discipline, careful control of tactics, and opposition to terrorism. The other major faction, which believed American workers were corrupted by America's capitalist system, wanted immediate revolution, involving action in the streets. Out of this second faction came the Weathermen, who advocated violence both against property ("trashing") and against people. Weathermen sponsored the "days of rage" in Chicago during which they destroyed property and fought with police. Soon they were charged with various crimes and went underground. Three of their number were killed when their dynamite accidentally exploded in New York City in 1970.

There are more than seven million college students in America today. Of these, only a handful practice terrorism. Indeed, some of the violence for which students are blamed is in fact perpetrated by non-students. Yet, despite their small number, those students who have adopted violence as a tactic have caused much destruction and have evoked considerable sympathy from other students. In a few major campus areas --the San Francisco Bay Area, Madison, and Cambridge --they have done great damage.

At Stanford, in April 1970, bands of "guerrillas" systematically terrorized the campus over a period of several nights, throwing rocks, breaking windows, and setting fire to buildings. After the August 1970 explosion at the University of Wisconsin, which killed a post-graduate student and did $6 million worth of damage, underground newspapers all over the country gleefully reported that another blow had been struck against the "pig nation." Students at Madison expressed regret at the death of the young researcher --but some refused to condemn the bombing of the Army Mathematics Center which caused it.

Increasingly, the argument was heard that the use of violence is justified, whether to promote social change, or to suppress campus unrest. Many Americans, confused and indignant over student unrest, concluded that only harsh and punitive measures could control students. Some Americans openly applauded police violence against students, arguing that they had only them- selves to blame if they were killed by police during disruptive or violent protests. Such public attitudes clearly encouraged violent responses by civil authorities.

Violent and terroristic incidents naturally received wide publicity, whereas the peaceful protests and constructive efforts of the majority of student activists have received less exposure. College and university disciplinary actions against disruptive or violent protestors have not been publicized. The appearance of a group of non-violent students, liberals and radicals, who have actively countered the violent style of the tactical extremists has also received little public attention.

A central theme, then, in the current history of student activism is the emergence of an even larger and more active group of students who, reacting against the extremist tactics of other students, were moved to press for change --which they insisted must come through peaceful, non-violent means.

An example of the new role of moderates occurred on May 1, 1970, when 12,000 people gathered on the New Haven Green in support of a group of Black Panthers charged with murder. The precautions of police officials, the cooperation of Yale University administrators, and the careful plans of Yale students and faculty helped prevent all but minor disturbances. Moderates retained control, too, of the 1969 April and October moratoriums against the Vietnam war. Indeed, on many campuses, these events were the perfect expression of the moderates' style and strength.

The moderates had also brought this style, to the campaign for Eugene McCarthy's presidential candidacy in 1968, to a number of marches on Washington --and, above all, to the spontaneous demonstrations for peace in May 1970.

Most of the activities during the student strike in May 1970 were peaceful, although there were some cases of disruption and violence. In many cases, state authorities took measures to avert violence. In California, Governor Ronald Reagan shut down for four days all 28 campuses of the University and State College systems. Guardsmen were sent onto the campuses of the Universities of Kentucky, South Carolina, Illinois at Urbana, and Wisconsin at Madison. There was trouble at Stanford, Berkeley, the University of Maryland at College Park and other places. At Fresno State College in California a firebomb destroyed a million dollar computer center.

But overall, violence by protestors was limited. University opposition to the combined issues of Cambodia, Kent State, and Jackson State had become so widespread that moderate protestors far outnumbered extremists, and the vast majority of protests remained peaceful. While nearly 30 percent of U. S. campuses were involved in some degree of strike activity, only five percent experienced violence.

The main reason for the general non-violence is again to be found in the paradox of tactics: the massive number of moderates who had joined the protest, partly because of violent acts against students, then guaranteed by their involvement that the protests would be largely non-violent. In part, moderates were able to do this because they outnumbered extremists. But more important were their decisions: on campus after campus, students, faculty, and administrators set up programs of action designed to provide politically viable alternatives to violent action.

Princeton University, for example, decided to reschedule its fall classes to allow students to work in political campaigns for the two weeks before election day. The Movement for a New Congress, an effort to elect anti-war candidates, spread from Princeton to other campuses. At scores of colleges, academic requirements were changed to give students time for political activities. These students canvassed homes, churches, and service clubs to present their views and gather signatures on anti-war petitions.

On May 9, 1970 more than 60,000 people, most of them students, assembled on the Ellipse in Washington for a peaceful anti-war demonstration. Thousands more went to Washington to lobby Congressmen, Sepators, Cabinet officers and even the President himself. For example, on May II, over a thousand students and faculty members from Yale led by President Kingman Brewster, Jr. talked with more than three hundred members of Congress or their aides.

Large delegations headed for the Capitol from Brandeis, from the University of North Carolina, from Haverford College, and from many other colleges. Although all this non-violent political activity indicated that the moderates had generally prevailed over extremists on the question of tactics, it is clear in retrospect that, on the question of ends, it was the radicals who were victorious. For years, radicals had been working to politicize universities, and in May 1970, entire universities were, in effect, mobilized against the policies of the present national administration. Students, faculty members and administrators united to. turn their attention away from scholarship to what seemed to them the far more urgent demands of politics and of keeping protest activities non-violent. In May 1970, students did not strike against their universities; they succeeded in making their universities strike against national policy.

Furthermore, the May 1970 strike movement revealed how much the meaning of tactical "moderation" had changed since the events at Berkeley in 1964. In the early 1960's, few moderates would have imagined themselves participating in a student strike, much less in a disruptive sit-in.

But as extremist tactics became more extreme and violent, moderate tactics became less moderate and began to include strikes and disruptions. Thus, in May 1970, moderate students and faculty members at hundreds of colleges and universities interrupted their normal academic activity -- in some cases, with official university sanction --in order to devote their time and effort to political work against the war. In some places, university property was used for political activity and classes and exams were postponed or cancelled.

For the most part, violence was avoided. But some universities had been politicized for at least a few weeks; and, perhaps most important in the long run, there was growing public concern, anger, indignation, and outrage at the spread of campus unrest.

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